Real-world policy packages in China and around the world will be shaped by both domestic energy transition objectives, like air quality, and constraints, such as the existence of high-carbon infrastructure (Photograph: Shutterstock)
This commentary was written by members of the IEA’s Environment and Climate Change Unit: Anita Hafner, Peter Janoska and Caroline Lee.
Last December, China announced a roadmap for establishing the largest carbon market in the world: an emissions trading system (ETS) that will start at 1.5 times the size of the European Union ETS, and very likely expand further. For the world’s largest energy consumer and greenhouse gas emitter, this national ETS is set to form a key element of its multi-layered policy approach to driving sustainable energy transition: a transition with aims not only to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but also improve air quality, spur green economic development and enhance energy security.
China is just one country – though a crucial one – pursuing sustainable energy transitions through a complex mixture of policies that cover multiple aspects of energy transition. These policies need to drive change in all energy sub-sectors, act in both the short- and long-term, be cost-effective and support innovation and diffusion of clean technologies.
Carbon pricing is a cornerstone that can support many of these goals. As of September 2017, over 40 countries and 25 provinces and cities have adopted carbon pricing policies. Taken together, these cover nearly a quarter of global greenhouse gas emissions. However compared to prices that would have a transformative impact on energy systems, carbon prices remain low in the vast majority of countries. For example, in IEA’s World Energy Outlook model, carbon prices reach USD 75-100/tCO2 by 2030 and USD 125-140/tCO2 by 2040 in a scenario consistent with meeting Paris Agreement goals. These are levels far above most current domestic carbon prices.
In power generation and industry, a robust carbon price tends to drive deployment of low-carbon fuels, increased efficiency, carbon capture and storage (CCS) and early retirement of high-emission assets. For example, high carbon prices in China would have a significant effect in reducing coal-fired power generation without CCS, particularly after 2025.
In contrast, in sectors that are shaped by consumer choice carbon pricing plays a more supportive role. For example in transport, carbon pricing can be crucial to offset the effects of lower oil prices in a decarbonised world. However further policies such as standards, mandates and subsidies are needed to unlock more substantial technology shifts, such as electrification, advanced biofuels development and other large-scale investments for transport infrastructure, which are not driven by price alone.
Therefore in the absence of such high carbon prices, complementary energy policies are needed to fill the gaps, creating even more complex policy mixes. These real-world policy packages will be shaped by both domestic energy transition objectives (such as economic development, climate goals, air quality, public health, energy security and access), and constraints (such as limited resources, barriers to raising energy prices, and existence of high-carbon infrastructure).
This is particularly true in power and industry. In power, regulations may be needed to actively encourage the retirement of coal-fired generation that is not CCS-equipped, something we have already seen in the UK and Canada. In both power and industry, measures would be needed to drive deployment of technologies such as CCS and for integration of variable renewables. In transport, even further strengthening of fuel standards and subsidies for alternative vehicles could be needed to offset the lack of carbon price incentive that would otherwise have moderated transport demand from conventional vehicles.
Beyond clarifying the role of carbon pricing within a country’s policy mix, it is crucial to understand how a suite of policies interact – either positively or negatively – and seek ways to enhance coherence and alignment of the whole policy package over time. The more complex the policy mix, the more difficult this challenge becomes.
The next phase of our IEA work programme will be to tackle these questions in the context of China’s national emissions trading system as it relates to ongoing power sector reform and a myriad of other low-carbon policies on energy conservation, renewable energy, and control of coal supply and consumption. But there will be a need by many countries around the world to further strengthen thoughtful, real-world packages of complementary energy policies to keep their sustainable energy transitions on track. The IEA will continue to contribute with our insights and analysis.
OMR: Stretched to the limit
12 July 2018
There are indications that production from leading producers is climbing and may reach record levels (Photograph: Shutterstock)
Since our last report, OPEC oil ministers and ten non-OPEC oil ministers have met and agreed to achieve 100% compliance with the Vienna Agreement (i.e. they will increase production). What this means in terms of volume and timing remains to be seen as the official communique contained little detail, but there are already indications from leading producers, particularly Saudi Arabia, its Gulf allies, and Russia, that production is climbing and may reach record levels. Such determination to ensure the steady supply of oil to world markets in the face of multiple challenges to stability is very welcome. The prospect of higher supply might be thought to have sent oil prices down, but in fact WTI prices have risen close to levels not seen since November 2014 and Brent prices have recently made a renewed attempt to reach $80/bbl. Higher prices are prolonging the fears of consumers everywhere that their economies will be damaged. In turn, this could have a marked impact on oil demand growth.
That prices have remained relatively high reflects various supply concerns, some of which will be with us for some time to come, e.g. Iran and Venezuela, and others that are probably shorter term. The clearly expressed determination of the United States to reduce Iran’s exports by as much as possible suggests that shipments could be reduced by significantly more than the 1.2 mb/d seen in the previous round of sanctions. In June, Iran’s crude exports fell back by about 230 kb/d, albeit from a relatively high level in May, as European purchases dropped by nearly 50%. Most of Iran’s oil goes to Asia, however, with China and India currently taking over 600 kb/d each. When you also consider that both China and India are exposed to Venezuela, importing respectively 250 kb/d and 325 kb/d, it is clear that the world’s second and third biggest oil consumers could face major challenges in sourcing alternative compatible barrels.
The re-emergence of Libya as a risk factor in global supply follows a series of attacks on key infrastructure that saw production plummet to around 500 kb/d in July from close to the 1 mb/d level seen for about a year. At the time of writing, the situation seemed to be improving, but we cannot know if stability will return. The fact that so much production is vulnerable is clearly a cause for concern. Incidentally, China receives nearly 140 kb/d of oil from Libya. Two other supply disruptions are likely to be short-lived. In Alberta, 360 kb/d of output from Syncrude’s heavy crude upgrading facility was shut-in from 20 June and in the North Sea oil production fell sharply in May by nearly 360 kb/d and output likely remained constrained due to summer maintenance and strike action in Norway. In addition, Brazilian production growth so far in 2018 has been lower than expected. At the same time, refiners’ thirst for crude oil will remain high during the summer period before seasonal maintenance kicks in.
Some of these supply issues are likely to be resolved, but the large number of disruptions reminds us of the pressure on global oil supply. This will become an even bigger issue as rising production from Middle East Gulf countries and Russia, welcome though it is, comes at the expense of the world’s spare capacity cushion, which might be stretched to the limit. This vulnerability currently underpins oil prices and seems likely to continue doing so. We see no sign of higher production from elsewhere that might ease fears of market tightness. Indeed, in this Report, our overall growth outlook for non-OPEC production in 2018 has been reduced slightly to 1.97 mb/d, although in turn our 2019 growth estimate shows a modest increase to 1.84 mb/d. On the demand side, although there are emerging signs of reduced economic confidence, and consumers are unhappy at higher prices, we retain our view that growth in 2018 will be 1.4 mb/d, and about the same next year.
The northern hemisphere summer promises to be anything but quiet as markets adjust to the ever-changing geopolitical and physical climate. We continue to be in a close dialogue with major producers and consumers, both inside and outside the IEA family, and are monitoring market developments in order to be prepared to advise on any support that might be needed.
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